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ABSTRACT
In 2013, a federal magistrate judge denied an FBI
request for a remote access search warrant, concluding that,
among other deficiencies, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure prevented him from granting a warrant to
hack a computer when the location of the device was not known.
Just five months later, the DOJ proposed amendments to Rule
41 seeking to eliminate the territorial limits on search warrants
in two cybercrime contexts: (1) when suspects conceal their
online locations and identities; and (2) when malware affects
users in five or more districts. Despite approval from the
necessary judicial committees and conferences, the amendments
must now survive review by the Supreme Court and Congress.
While the government argues that the amendments represent
small but necessary changes, critics raise a number of far-
reaching legal and policy concerns, labeling the amendments as
the legalization of "New Invasive Global Hacking Powers." This
paper seeks to impartially present and evaluate both sides of the
argument. This Article offers concrete alterations to the
amendments, which ensure that law enforcement agencies are
able to effectively investigate and prosecute cybercrimes while
simultaneously protecting privacy, safeguarding civil liberties,
and guaranteeing that remote access search warrants do not
become ubiquitous tools of surveillance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faced a
serious problem. Agents located troves of child pornography
stored on an underground network of untraceable websites
frequented by unidentified users.1 The government could
identify neither the individual hosting the website nor the
users disseminating and viewing the illicit images. The FBI
initiated "Operation Torpedo", seeking a court-issued warrant
to collect identifying information on the individuals that visited
the websites. If issued, the warrant would allow the FBI to use
a remote access search technique to alter the website's code to
include secret instructions compelling all computers that
visited the site to send identifying information directly to the
FBI. 2 Because the court issued the warrant, the FBI was able
to identify the previously anonymous users and arrest fourteen
suspects. The operation's success prompted the FBI to continue
its usage of the remote access search tactic in future
investigations.
3
However, a judicial opinion issued one year later in an
unrelated case challenged the legitimacy of remote access
searches.4 The 2013 ruling denied the FBI's application for a
remote access search warrant due to concerns regarding
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (Rule 41), which
restricts a judge's ability to issue warrants outside of his or her
district.5 Due to venue requirements, a judge may only issue a
warrant to search property known to be within the area over
which he or she has jurisdiction.6 This requirement is not
satisfied when a judge does not know where the suspected
criminals or their computers are located. Out of fear that the
1 See FBI Admits to Exploiting Tor To Take Down Child Porn Behemoth,
RT (Sept. 13, 2013), http://rt.com/usa/fbi-exploiting-tor-child-porn-842
[https://perma.cc/E8DJ-TTPM].
2 Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Comment on the Proposed Amendment
to Rule 41 Concerning Remote Searches of Electronic Storage Media,
(Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets
/aclu comments on rule 41.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAE3-X3WV].
3 See Kevin Poulsen, FBI Spyware Has Been Snaring Extortionists,
Hackers for Years, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/04
/fbi-spyware-pro [https://perma. cc/9NGQ-XFXL].
4 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
5 Id.
6 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)-(5).
2016
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ruling might impede future efforts to curb cybercrime, the
government has taken steps to amend Rule 41.
Currently, Rule 41 only authorizes out-of-district - also
known as extraterritorial - warrants in four circumstances: (1)
property that is in the district when the warrant is issued but
might be moved outside of the district before the warrant is
executed; (2) tracking devices, which may be monitored outside
the district if installed within the district; (3) investigations of
domestic or international terrorism; and (4) property located
within territory occupied for a United States diplomatic or
consular mission.7 These exceptions do not relax the venue
requirements in the digital crime context. Remote access
search techniques allow the FBI to search a computer without
handling it physically, instead searching its contents through
an Internet connection. The amendments to Rule 41 would
clarify the legality of extraterritorial remote access search
warrants in two scenarios: (1) when suspects conceal their
online location and identity, engaging in crime anonymously;
and (2) when malware affects innocent users in five or more
districts.
8
The government emphasizes that the amendments would
not generate a "new" law enforcement search tool. Remote
access searches have been utilized for nearly fifteen years for
tasks ranging from monitoring location information9 to logging
7 Id.
8 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, Advisory Comm. on Criminal
Rules, on the Report of the Advisory Committee of Criminal Rules to
Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
8 (May 5, 2014), in COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL,
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REQUEST FOR COMMENT 326, 338 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.uscourts. gov/file/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments-
federal-rules -appellate-bankruptcy-civil-and-criminal
[https://perma.cc/9ZJW-GRRC]) [hereinafter REQUEST FOR COMMENT].
The proposed language reads as follows: "(6) a magistrate judge with
authority in any district where activities related to a crime may have
occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search
electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored
information located within or outside that district if: (A) the district
where the media or information is located has been concealed through
technological means; or (B) in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S. C.
§ 1030(a)(5), the media are protected computers that have been damaged
without authorization and are located in five or more districts." Id. at
340.
9 Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In the Matter of the
Search of Network Investigative Technique ("NIT") for Email Address
texan.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT at 4 (D. Col. Dec. 11,
2012).
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decryption passwords.10 The FBI has used information collected
with remote access search tools to indict, for example, a suspect
who extorted a casino,1" a sexual predator who threatened a
teenage girl,12 and a sixteen-year-old Swedish acker charged
with breaching networks at Cisco and NASA.1 3 Similarly, the
government takes the position that the extraterritorial
authority proposed by the amendments is not novel. The four
exceptions currently embedded in Rule 41 demonstrate the
need for exemptions from the venue requirements. The
amendments merely seek to expand the ability of law
enforcement to apply for extraterritorial authority in instances
that are not explicitly covered by the existing exceptions.
Concerns over this expansion in power are legitimate. A
variety of professors, media outlets, and non-profit
organizations have levied harsh criticisms at the proposed
amendments. Opponents believe the amendments will provide
law enforcement agencies with mechanisms to bypass the
Fourth Amendment and lead to a circumvention of other legal
oversight regimes.14  These critics argue that a lack of
transparency and minimization procedures in the warrant
applications leaves judges unable to adequately assess the
potential uses of remote access search techniques.15 Further,
usage of remote access search techniques will likely increase if
the amendments are approved. Finally, opponents point to the
amendments' potential unintended consequences, including a
harmful effect on the Internet ecosystem,1 6 an increased
10 See FBI Has a Magic Lantern to Light the Path to Suspects' Computers,
ABOUT.COM (last accessed Dec. 17, 2014), http://usgovinfo.about.com
/library/weekly/aa121401a.htm [https://perma.cc/PVGZ-NANE].
11 Poulsen, supra note 3.
12 Id.
13 Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Swedish National
Charged with Hacking and Theft of Trade Secrets Related to Alleged
Computer Intrusions at NASA and CISCO (May 5, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2012
/03/15/petterssonlndicted.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE9U-PCCU].
14 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the
Proposed Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches
of Electronic Storage Media 22 (Oct. 31, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu comment on remote access propo
sal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y4Z-DSBM].
15 See, e.g., Laura Donohue, Remarks at Panel on the Legal and Policy
Implications of Hacking by Law Enforcement, at 21:40 (Feb. 18, 2014),
available at http://vimeo.com/88165230 [https://perma.cc/F82Y-KSN7].
16 See, e.g., Bijan Madhani, Government Seeks Expanded Hacking Ability in
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incentive for the government to stockpile zero-day exploits,17
and a potential for forum shopping. 18
This paper seeks to balance impartially the need for
amendments to Rule 41 with the legitimate concerns outlined
above. Part II will assess the government's justifications for
altering Rule 41, detail the proposed amendments, and
examine the methods used to conduct remote access searches.
Part III will expose various legal and policy concerns with the
amendments, as well as the potential consequences of enacting
them. Part IV will recommend alterations to the amendments
that reflect these concerns and consequences.
I. The Department of Justice's Vision of Change
A. The Rationale for Amending Rule 41
The amendments to Rule 41 would remedy administrative
hurdles that frustrate the effective investigation of increasingly
common digital crimes. This is accomplished through the
addition of two carve-outs for extraterritorial search warrants
and the amendment of the notice requirements for remote
access searches. The first carve-out would confer authority to
judges to grant extraterritorial warrants when suspects use
anonymizing software to mask the location of their computers -
in essence, codifying the authority used in Operation Torpedo.
The second carve-out pertains to the investigation of criminal
violations of parts of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) - most notably, crime that is perpetrated by botnets.1 9
Unrelated to the use of anonymizing software, this exception
would allow a single court to issue multi-district, multi-
computer remote access search warrants for all computers
infected by a given piece of malware. Among other merits, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) believes that the amendments
will finally reconcile Rule 41 with the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which authorizes a judge
to issue a warrant for searches of electronic information in
another district.
20
17 See, e.g., supra note 14.
18 See, e.g., Memorandum from Orin Kerr to Members of the Rule 41
Subcomm. at 1-2 (Feb. 3, 2014), in Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules,
supra note 28, at 239-40.
19 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8.
20 Id. at 519; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a) 2711(3)(A)(11) (2012); United
States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 662 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the
contention that Rule 41(b)'s limits trump 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)); United
States v. Berkos, 543 F.3d 392, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rule
41(b) "does not apply to § 2703(a)").
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1. Exceptions for Extraterritorial Search Warrants.
In a letter to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
suggesting the amendments, the Department of Justice asserts
that amending Rule 41 is necessary for successful
investigations of users implementing anonymizing software. As
currently written, Rule 41 deprives judges of the power to issue
a warrant if a suspected criminal is using an anonymizing tool,
like the "Tor" network, to hide his or her device's true Internet
Protocol (IP) address while perpetuating crime. Take, for
example, an individual issuing bomb threats over the Internet
by means of an anonymizing tool. The proxy service operates as
an intermediary that routes the communication through a
network of distributed relay computers.21 The communication
hops from relay computer to relay computer until it is
eventually sent to the intended recipient.22 When the recipient
- maybe a user on the receiving end of an email or a website on
which a threatening post is made - receives the
communication, he or she solely collects the IP address of the
final proxy computer, not the original actor. As such, law
enforcement is unable to determine the true location of the
device. Therefore, if a judge only has authority to issue a
warrant for devices he or she knows to be in his or her district,
as the current venue requirements dictate, no judge in the
country would have authority to issue the warrant in this
investigation. The DOJ asserts that the frequency of this
scenario is increasing because cyber criminals are using
"sophisticated anonymizing technologies" with greater
regularity.2
3
The second aspect of the amendments, reflecting the DOJ's
desire to prevent violations of the CFAA, relates directly to
botnets.24 A botnet is a network of computers infected with
malicious software that enables simultaneous command by a
single control mechanism or "master."25 This network of
compromised computers or "zombies" can be used to send
21 See Kevin Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website, and the FBI Could End Up
in Your Computer, WIRED (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/08
/operation torpedo [https://perma.cc/GH47-QFJ7].
22 Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
[https://perma.cc/9QJK-8NMV].
23 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 7; see REQUEST
FOR COMMENT, supra note 8, at 325, 338.
24 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 13, in
REQUEST FOR COMMENT, supra note 8. The committee note makes specific
reference to the creation and control of botnets in its description of
criminal activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
25 Zach Lerner, Microsoft the Botnet Hunter: The Role of Public-Private
Partnerships in Mitigating Botnets, 28 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014).
2016
6
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/2
32 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 18
unsolicited email or span, create false web traffic, or install
spyware to collect personal information.
26
There is a legitimate and impending need for law
enforcement to develop tools to combat botnets. An individual
botnet can command over 12 million zombies concurrently.27 In
support of the efforts to amend Rule 41, Assistant Attorney
General Raman stated, "[b]otnets are a significant threat to the
public: they are used to conduct large-scale denial of service
attacks, steal personal and financial data, and distribute
malware designed to invade the privacy of users of the host
computers."28 The Center for Strategic and International
Studies predicts that malicious cyber activity costs the
economy between $300 billon and $1 trillion per year globally
and between $24 billion and $120 billion per year in the United
States alone.29 Microsoft estimates that a single botnet caused
over $500 million in losses worldwide.
30
In its investigation of botnets, the FBI can gain valuable
information by gathering data from and disseminating
information to the infected zombies.3 1 The FBI can also send
messages to users alerting them of the botnet, offering
instructions on how to determine if their device was infected,
and instructing them to "consult a computer professional." 32 In
26 Id. at 2.
27 Anatomy of a Botnet: How the Arbor Security Engineering & Response
Team (ASERT) Discovers, Analyzes and Mitigates DDoS Attacks, ARBOR
NETWORKS 2 (2012), https://www.arbornetworks.com/images/documents
/White%20Papers%20and%20Research/WP ASERT EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TGDY-LZT9].
28 Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to The
Honorable Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules 2
(Sept. 18, 2013), in Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Materials for
April 7-8, 2014 Meeting 172, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/RulesAndPohcies/rules/Agenda / 20Books/Criminal/CR2014-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DTL-WB4Q] [hereinafter Advisory Comm. on Criminal
Rules].
29 Lerner, supra note 25, at 8 (citing CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INTIL STUDIES,
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME AND CYBER ESPIONAGE 5 (Jul.
2013), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-
cybercrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCV3-3Y9P]).
30 Id. (citing Press Release, Microsoft, Financial Services and Others Join
Forces To Combat Massive Cybercrime Ring, Microsoft (June 5, 2013),
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2013/jun13/06-05dcupr.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E8C2-DZRQ]).
31 Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewsi, Director, Office of Policy and
Legislation to Judge John F. Keenan, Chair, Subcomm. on Rule 41, at 2
(Jan. 17, 2014) (included in the Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules,
supra note 28).
32 Lerner, supra note 25, at 8 (citing Gregg Keizer, Feds Lead Biggest
Botnet Takedown Ever, End Massive Clickjack Fraud, COMPUTERWORLD
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9221699/Feds-lead biggest botnet takedown ever end massive cickjac
k fraud [https://perma.cc/9QTL-9Z4N]).
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its investigation of the Coreflood Botnet, the FBI went a step
further and delivered a disabling command to the infected
zombies, which removed the botnet from their devices
entirely.33 The FBI believes that remote access searches are
critical to "assisting victim notification, identifying additional
victims, furthering identification of perpetrators, and/or taking
steps to disrupt the command and control functions of the
botnet."
34
The government argues that applying for warrants
separately in each district in which a zombie device is located
presents excessive burdens.35 Thus, while altering Rule 41 to
prevent botnet-related attacks is not necessary, it would relieve
a number of administrative obstacles that hinder successful
investigation and mitigation. A single botnet can infect millions
of users;36 thus, effective investigation of these crimes can
require law enforcement action in dozens of judicial districts.37
Coordinating simultaneous warrant applications in every
district necessarily imposes burdens on both the investigators
and magistrate judges.38 Each application concerns a common
piece of malicious software and the affidavits supporting the
warrant applications are virtually identical.39 Requiring a
separate magistrate judge in each district to review virtually
identical affidavits is a waste of judicial resources and creates
"delays that may have adverse consequences for the
investigation[s]."40 Thus, the amendments eek to "remove an
unnecessary obstruction currently impairing the ability of law
enforcement to investigate botnets and other multi-district
Internet crimes."
41
2. Amending the Notice Requirement for Remote
Access Searches
The amendments would also alter Rule 41's notice
requirement, reflecting the government's opinion that the
subject of a remote access search cannot be provided notice in
precisely the same manner as the subject of a physical search.42
33 Id. (citing Kim Zetter, With Court Order, FBI Hijacks 'Coreflood' Botnet,
Sends Kill Signal, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.wired.com/2011/04/coreflood [https://perma.cc/2QP7-VATN].
34 See Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 31, at 213. It is
important to note and underscore that the information is pertinent to
identifying the zombies, not the master.
35 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8.
36 Lerner, supra note 25, at 12.
31 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 326.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Letter from Mythih Raman, supra note 28, at 173.
41 Id.
42 See Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 327.
2016
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Notice of remote access searches, the government asserts,
should be provided electronically instead of in-person. The
government also argues that when law enforcement agents
cannot reasonably determine the identity or location of the
owner of the device, Rule 41 should provide for an exemption.
According to the DOJ, these changes would aid in prosecuting
criminals without altering the substantive standards the
government must satisfy in warrant applications for
extraterritorial searches.43  Supporters stress that the
amendments do not provide authority for new law enforcement
tools or broaden the existing ones.44 In fact, the application of
the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment -
particularity and probable cause - remain unaffected.45 Thus,
the DOJ highlights that the amendments only "address the
venue question - the question of which judge can issue a
warrant that ... the Fourth Amendment allows."
46
B. The Proposed Amendments
The DOJ proposed the amendments to Rule 41 just five
months after a court ruling challenged the validity of
extraterritorial remote access search warrants.47  Judge
Stephen Smith, a federal magistrate judge in Houston known
for speaking out against secret electronic surveillance,48 denied
an FBI request for a remote access search warrant in April
2013. 49 The government had sought authorization to use a
remote access search tool to collect identifying information
about an individual suspected of bank fraud.50 The warrant
would have sanctioned the collection of network-level
43 See Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 31, at 259. The
DOJ emphasizes that the amendments do not "impact the standards for
when notice may appropriately be delayed with the approval of the
issuing court" and is unlikely to "substantially impact existing practice
with respect to notice of such warrants." Id.
44 See Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules 8 (Apr. 7-8, 2014), in Advisory






47 The DOJ's letter even mentions the case as an example in which a
warrant application did not satisfy the territorial jurisdiction
requirements. See Letter from Mythili Raman, supra note 28, at 172.
48 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, One Judge Who Is Leading the Charge Against
Secret Orders, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-
DGB-23315 [https://perma.cc/SEZ2-W2JG].
49 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
50 Id.
9
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information and installation of software that could be used in
part to take photographs with the device's camera.
51
Judge Smith described the application as an attempt to
"hack a computer suspected of criminal use," and rejected the
warrant.52 The judge focused on three questions: "(1) whether
the territorial limits of a Rule 41 search warrant w[ere]
satisfied; (2) whether the particularity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment ha[d] been met; and (3) whether the
Fourth Amendment requirements for video camera
surveillance ha[d] been shown."53 In the end, Judge Smith
"concluded that the territorial requirement in Rule 41(b)
precluded a warrant for a remote search when the location of
the computer was not known."54 He determined that the
warrant application did not fall under any of the
extraterritorial exceptions set out in Rule 41(b), including:
items that may be moved out of the district, tracking devices,
searches related to terrorism, and investigations related to
consular missions.55 Although conceding that there might be
sound reasons to update Rule 41's territorial limitations, Judge
Smith ultimately concluded that "the extremely intrusive
nature of such a search requires careful adherence to the
strictures of Rule 41 as currently written."56
In response to Judge Smith's ruling, the DOJ wrote a letter
to Judge Raggi, a member of the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules, proposing changes to Rule 41. 57 The Advisory
Committee, composed mostly of judges with no legislative
oversight or input, is charged with studying the operation and
impact of the rules of practice and procedure in the criminal
justice system and, when necessary, making changes and
additions to the rules to promote simplicity, fairness, justice,
and frugality.58 "The rules amendment process, at its fastest,
spans three years from proposal to full enactment" and
requires that proposals pass through specific subcommittees
51 Id. at 756.
52 Id. at 755.
53 Id. Additionally, Judge Smith expressed concern with regard to the lack
of detail explaining how the government would install the software as
well as efforts to minimize harm to innocent people.
54 Memorandum from Sara Beale and Nancy King, Reporters to Members,
Criminal Rules Advisory Comm. 3 (March 17, 2014), in Advisory Comm.
on Criminal Rules, supra note 28, at 156-57.
55 See Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 324 n.7.
56 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
51 See Letter from Mythih Raman, supra note 28, at 171.
58 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 2. See also Mark R. Kravitz et al., They Were Meant
for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper and the Rules Enabling Act, 46
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 495, 504 (2013).
2016
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and face public comment, as well as gain approval by the
Supreme Court.
59
The DOJ's letter suggests two sets of changes, which, if
enacted, would establish "a court-supervised framework
through which law enforcement can successfully investigate
and prosecute sophisticated Internet crimes."60 First, the
proposed framework would modify Rule 41(b) to add a fifth
exception to the in-district venue requirement. This exception
would authorize out-of-district warrants in those investigations
where location information is "concealed through technological
means," or where CFAA violations have damaged computers
located in five or more districts.61 As a result of this exemption,
Rule 41 would authorize a court in any district "where
activities related to a crime have occurred" to issue a warrant
"for electronic storage media and electronically stored
information located within or outside that district."62 Second,
the amendments would update Rule 41's notice requirements.
Currently, an officer executing a warrant must provide the
subject of the search with both a copy of the warrant and a
receipt for property taken.63 The amendments would modify
these requirements in remote access searches, such that the
government would only need to "make reasonable efforts to
serve a copy of the warrant on the person whose property was
searched or whose information was seized or copied."64 The
service used to deliver this notice would have to be "reasonably
calculated to reach that person."
65
The DOJ's proposal advanced through the Advisory
Committee's standard review process. The Rule 41
subcommittee approved the proposal on March 12, 2014 and
forwarded it to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules.66
Through the early part of 2014, a representative of the DOJ
engaged in intense debate with Professor Orin Kerr, a member
of the subcommittee, as documented in a series of
memoranda.67 Following this debate, edits were made to the
initial draft,68 and in August 2014, the Advisory Committee
59 Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 31, at 245
60 See Letter from Mythih Raman, supra note 28, at 171.
61 See Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 327.
62 See Letter from Mythih Raman, supra note 28, at 171.
63 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C).
64 See Proposed Amendments o the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at
12, in REQUEST FOR COMMENT, supra note 8, at 338, 340.
65 Id.
66 See supra note 2.
67 Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, supra note 28, at 239-56.
68 Minutes of Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules at 6 (Apr. 7-8, 2014), in
(Advisory Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure Materials for May
29-30 Meeting, supra note 44, at 514. In addition to exceptions for
location concealment and violations of the CFAA, the proposal originally
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officially recommended, "that the proposed amendment[s] to
Rule 41 be published for public comment.' 69 The public
comment phase followed for three months concluding in a
hearing held on November 5, 2014.70 On March 16, 2015, the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules approved the rule
change by a vote of eleven to one.71 The Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure approved the amendments in
May 2015, and the Judicial Conference followed suit in
September.72  At that point, on October 9, 2015, the
amendments were transmitted to the Supreme Court, which
can adopt the amendments by order before May 1, 2016. If the
Court adopts them, they will take effect no earlier than
December 1, 2016, unless Congress enacts legislation to reject,
modify, or defer them.
73
C. Capabilities, Methods, and Processes Used to
Conduct Remote Access Searches
The public first learned of the government's use of remote
access search techniques in 2001.74 That year, journalists
uncovered FBI software-codenamed Magic Lantern-that
covertly accessed information stored on targets' computers.
75
sought to permit authorization of remote searches of "electronic
information accessible from a computer at a known location when the
information is stored remotely in another district." Memorandum from
Sara Beale & Nancy King, supra note 54, at 157. In other words, it would
have authorized the FBI to execute a warrant on a person in New York to
remotely and simultaneously seize the data on the computer itself as well
as all data accessible from that computer stored with cloud-based servers
anywhere in the country.
69 See Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 327.
70 Dibya Sarkar, Federal Panel Holds Hearing on Rule Change that
Expands FBI Electronic Surveillance Powers, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/federal-panel-
holds -hearing-rule-change-expands -fbi-electronic-surveillance/2014-11-05
[https://perma.cc/LME8-9THL].
71 See Dustin Volz, FBI's Plan to Expand Hacking Power Advances Despite
Privacy Fears, NAT'L J. (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://www.benton.org/headlines/fbis-plan-expand-hacking-power-
advances-despite-privacy-fears [https://perma.cc/J32U-AFF7].




74 In reality, these techniques may go back as far as 1999, when the FBI
placed a covert keystroke logger on the computer of a criminal with
significant mob ties. See Kevin Poulsen, FBIs Secret Spyware Tracks
Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats, WIRED (July 18, 2007),
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007 /07 /fbi spyware
[https://perma.cc/GTEE-MS5T].





Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/2
38 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 18
This tool, initially labeled "a workbench project," was renamed
the Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV)
and reportedly entered into regular use by law enforcement
agencies in 2002.76 However, the government did not disclose
the use of CIPAVs as a prosecutorial tool until 2007. That year,
the FBI applied for and received a warrant to implement a
CIPAV in its investigation of a MySpace user who had made
bomb threats to a high school.77 The CIPAV infiltrated the
individual's computer, surreptitiously gathered a wide range of
information, and sent it to the FBI.78 Warrant applications
pursuant to Rule 41, like the one used in the MySpace bomber
investigation, are considered ex parte without adversarial
representation.7
9
In the following years, the FBI used CIPAVs more
frequently and rebranded them as network investigative
techniques (NITs).80 In 2012, an FBI task force officer in
Colorado applied for a warrant to employ an NIT in the
collection of information from a user suspected of threatening
to detonate bombs at a jail, hotel, group of international
airports, and number of major universities.8 1 The suspect, who
referred to himself as "Mo," made these threats via voice over
Internet Protocol, email, and video chat over a month-long
period.82 However, he used a "virtual proxy" and avoided
revealing his identity or location - both physical and digital.8 3
A federal magistrate judge in Colorado authorized an
716 See Memorandum from [redacted] to CTCs 1 (Mar. 7, 2002),
https://www.eff.org/document/fbicipav-05pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9HS-
8GPD]. When introduced, the CIPAV was initially referred to as an
Internet Protocol Address Verifier.
77 See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, In the Matter of the
Search of Any Computer Accessing Electronic Message(s) Directed to
Administrator(s) of MySpace Account "Timberlinebombinfo" and Opening
Messages Delivered to That Account by the Government, No. MJ07-5114,
at 2-3, 6-9 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2007), http://www.politechbot.com/docs
/fbi.cipav. sanders.affidavit.071607.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9D-EBKK]
[hereinafter Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant].
78 Poulsen, supra note 3.
79 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
80 See Poulsen, supra note 3.
81 Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In the Matter of the
Search of Network Investigative Technique ("NIT") for Email Address
texan.slayer@yahoo.om, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT, at 4 (D. Col. Dec. 11,
2012). The calls demanded the release of James Holmes, the suspect in
the Aurora Theater or Dark Knight shooting spree.
82 Id.
83 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBI's Search for Mo,' Suspect in
Bomb Threats, Highlights Use of Malware for Surveillance, WASH. POST
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extraterritorial remote access search, enabling the FBI to
collect information on "Mo" through an NIT.8 4 The NIT covertly
planted software on the suspect's computer, which delivered
various location and identifying information to the FBI.
8 5
Remote access search tools have a number of capabilities,
ranging in complexity and invasiveness. The most basic
function of a remote access search tool is collecting the IP
address of a targeted computer.8 6 Law enforcement agents can
use this IP address to subpoena subscriber information from
the Internet Service Provider (ISP) responsible for that IP
address. In the FBI's investigation of a target using
anonymizing software, this could lead to the discovery of a
physical address for the suspect. In the investigation of a large-
scale botnet, this could provide points of contact for infected
users. Remote access search tools can also gather more
sophisticated identifying information, such as the target's MAC
address; open communication ports; a list of programs running
on the computer; the type, version, and serial number of the
operating system; the type and version of the web browser; the
default language; time zone; registered computer name; logged-
in user name; and list of user accounts.8 7 A remote access
search tool can reveal inherently personal information about a
user's Internet activity including "firewall logs, caches, browser
history and cookies, 'bookmarked' or 'favorite' Web pages,
search terms that the user entered into any Internet search
engine, and records of user-typed Web addresses."88
Additionally, these tools can collect actual content, such as
"documents .... user profiles, e-mail contents, e-mail contacts,
chat messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence."8 9
Remote access techniques can also actively enable functions on
the target's computer or mobile device. For example, the
84 Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In the Matter of the
Search of Network Investigative Technique ("NIT") for email address
texan.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT at 1 (D. Col. Dec. 11,
2012).
85 Id. at 4.
86 Id. at 16.
87 Id.
88 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
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government can remotely turn on GPS chips,90 microphones,91
and webcams.
9 2
Remote access search tools enable the FBI to collect
prospective, real-time data on suspects. In its investigation of a
MySpace user threatening to bomb a high school, the FBI
applied for a warrant to install a remote access search tool with
a "pen register" element.9 3 The tool continuously recorded and
transmitted "the routing and destination addressing
information for electronic communications originating from the
activating computer."94 Similarly, in a 2012 remote access
search warrant application, the FBI sought to collect
"prospective data obtained during a 30-day monitoring
period."9 5 The desired contemporaneous data included location
data based on latitude and longitude calculations as well as
photographs taken using the target computer's built-in
camera.
96
The FBI relies on two primary methods of implementing
remote access search tools to enable the capabilities discussed
above: social-engineering attacks and watering-hole attacks.
97
These methods require different techniques and implicate
varying concerns. Understanding how law enforcement
employs these tools is necessary to adequately address their
utility, the consequences of their use, and the need for limiting
their capabilities.
The first method, social engineering, is commonly used in
investigations of suspects who have employed anonymizing
90 See id.
91 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Danny Yadron, FBI Taps Hacker Tactics
to Spy on Suspects, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000142412788732399700457864199338
8259674 [https://perma.cc/4FG5-WXHX].
92 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
958 F. Supp. 2d at 755-56; see also Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 83
(highlighting the ability to do so covertly without triggering the indicator
light that alerts the user that the camera is operating).
93 A pen register (or dialed number recorder) is a device that permits the
recording of telephone numbers dialed out from a particular phone.
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Allowable Use of Federal Pen Register
and Trap and Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use, 15
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 537 (2006). Ordinarily, law enforcement must satisfy the
requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3121 in order to obtain a pen register.
Id.
94 See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, supra note 77, at 13-
14.
95 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755-56 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
96 Id. at 756.
91 Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Comment on the Proposed Amendment
to Rule 41 Concerning Remote Searches of Electronic Storage Media,
supra note 2 at 5-9.
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software. Agents send a communication - often an email - to
the target, which requires a specific action - often clicking a
link or opening an attachment.98 The FBI used this method in
its investigation of "Mo", the man who made numerous bomb
threats in Colorado. Although a sergeant with the Denver
Police communicated with the suspect regularly over email,
"Mo" used anonymizing software that made it impossible to
determine his or her IP address.99 The FBI filed a warrant
application seeking authorization to embed an NIT in the
sergeant's next e-mail to the target. Once opened, the NIT
would surreptitiously install software and collect identifying
information. "All investigators needed, it seemed, was for Mo to
sign on to his account and, almost instantaneously, the
software would start reporting information back to
Quantico."100
In situations where agents do not have an ongoing dialogue
with the suspect, social engineering attacks often require
deception on the part of law enforcement. For example, agents
may impersonate a third-party, tricking the suspect into
clicking on the activating mechanism. In order to deliver a
CIPAV in the investigation of the MySpace user making bomb
threats in 2007, the FBI emailed the target a fake Associated
Press article that, once clicked, exploited a vulnerability in his
web browser.101
The second method of delivery, a watering-hole attack, also
known as a "drive by download," is likewise prevalent in the
investigation of users implementing anonymizing techniques.
Watering hole attacks are effective when law enforcement
agents do not know the identity of a suspect, but know a
website that he or she would likely frequent. Agents can then
install custom code on the website. This code includes computer
instructions that cause all visiting users' computers to deliver
specific information to a computer controlled or known by the
government.1 02 The FBI utilized a watering-hole attack in
98 Id. at 5.
99 Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In the Matter of the
Search of Network Investigative Technique ("NIT") for email address
texan.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT at 4 (D. Col. Dec. 11,
2012).
100 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 83.
101 See Ellen Nakashima & Paul Farhi, FBI Lured Suspect with Fake Web





102 Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning Remote Searches of Electronick
Storage Media, supra note 2, at 6.
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Operation Torpedo to identify and indict 14 users of child
pornography sites hosted on Tor. 103 It is unclear whether social
engineering or watering-hole attacks would be better suited to
investigate violations of the CFAA.
Regardless of the method of delivery, the surveillance
software infection process follows the same basic steps. The
first step is reconnaissance, in which agents ascertain a
selector - an email address, user name, website, and so on - to
identify the target.104 Next, the agents must prepare the code
that will be delivered to the target's device to carry out the
planned attack.10 5 Third, agents introduce the attacking code to
the target's device through one of the methods detailed
above.10 6 In step four, the attacking code bypasses the user's
security software or abuses a vulnerability in the target's
software.10 7 Next, the attacking code installs the surveillance
software on the target's computer.1 08 Ultimately, the software
collects and transmits the desired information to the
government.109 In some cases, the attacking code erases itself,
while in others, it remains on the device for an extended period
of time.110
II. Concerns Over the Expansion of Rule 41
Both civil society and the media have criticized the
proposed amendments to Rule 41. Reporters have classified the
proposed rule change as a means "to seize significant new
powers to hack into and carry out surveillance of computers
throughout the US." ' 1 Numerous organizations, including the
ACLU, New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute,
Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), and Access Now, as well as a
professor at the Hastings College of Law, testified in opposition
to the proposal at the Advisory Committee's November 2014
open hearing.11 2 Chris Soghoian, a technologist and policy
103 See Poulsen, supra note 21.
104 See supra note 14.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 7-8.
107 Id. at 8.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 9.
111 Ed Pilkington, FBI Demands New Powers to Hack into Computers and
Carry Out Surveillance, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/29/fbi-powers-hacking-
computers-surveillance [https://perma. cc/A8LQ-4TLM].
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analyst at the ACLU, believes that the amendments "giv[e] the
FBI the green light to hack into any computer in the country or
around the world."113 Thus, while the government defends the
amendments as mere extensions of an extraterritorial caveat
for two pressing situations, others attack them with Orwellian
concerns.
This section will first address concerns regarding the lack of
transparency and minimization procedures in the government's
remote access search warrant applications. Next, this section
will consider whether changing Rule 41 would result in an
increase in the use of remote access search techniques. Third,
this section will discuss whether remote access search
warrants conform to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Next, this section will discuss the fear that the
amendments to Rule 41 would allow law enforcement to
circumvent existing legal oversight regimes. Finally, this
section will detail a number of unintended consequences of the
Rule 41 amendments, such as disrupting Internet
infrastructure, incentivizing stockpiling of zero-day exploits,
and permitting forum shopping.
A. A Lack of Transparency
Critics argue that the government may not be disclosing
exactly how it plans to use and implement the new Rule 41
authority. The general nature of remote access searches can be
gleaned from sample warrant applications provided by the
government, warrant applications filed in federal court, and
the Advisory Committee's memoranda. However, these sources
may not paint a full picture of the remote search techniques'
invasiveness. The sample warrants include references to
NITs, 114 RNTs,115 and CIPAVs,116 but do not provide an
adequate description of the methods by which the tools will be
delivered. Laura Donohue, a professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center, states that government "applications
do not include detailed technology, or technological
explanations as to how [the remote access search] is actually
going to be executed, enter the computer, exactly what
information is going to be obtained, which other devices might
be infected, how many devices may be infected, and so on."11 7
113 Brett Wilkins, FBI Seeking New Invasive Global Hacking Powers,
ETHICSINTECH (Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.ethiesintech.com/fbi-seeking-
invasive-global-hacking-powers [https://perma.cc/4W8M-RCTE].
114 Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 31, at 200-203.
115 Id. at 215-16.
116 Id. at 217.
117 See supra note 15; see also Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi,
supra note 31, at 19, 25 (stating knowledge of dozens of cases involving
2016
18
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/2
44 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 18
Thus, in seeking remote access warrants, the FBI does not
provide the judiciary with proper notice or understanding of
how the tools will be used.
As such, the judges charged with ruling on remote access
search warrant applications may not fully understand what
they are being asked to authorize. What, in reality, amounts to
the use of hacking software to take advantage of computer
vulnerabilities in order to breach a device's defense is described
as the simple installation of software that will extract
information. Chris Soghoian points out that these search
warrant applications do not include the words "hack,"
"malware," or "exploit."118 As Kevin Poulsen writes, "Instead
the NIT comes across as something you'd be happy to spend 99
cents for in the App Store."1 9 The Operation Torpedo warrant
application, for example, merely revealed that "the web site
would augment content with some additional computer
instructions." 1 20 Another FBI affidavit states, "the exact nature
of these commands, processes, capabilities, and their
configuration is classified as a law enforcement sensitive
investigative technique, the disclosure of which would likely
jeopardize other on-going investigations and/or future use of
the technique."1 21 Recently, a federal judge in Washington
indicated the practical effect of this concealment. The judge
misinterpreted the use of the word "instructions" - thinking
the word referred to a human following instructions as opposed
to computer code - and failed to understand where the data
obtained from the defendant came from.122 As a result of this
misunderstanding, the judge clashed with the public defender,
confused as to how the FBI could have accessed information
from the defendant's computer when "they [didn't] have his
computer."1 23 Without suitable transparency, the judiciary is
unable to adequately oversee the warrant application process.
The government subscribes to a policy of revealing "as little
information as possible" about how remote access search tools
are utilized. In a redacted email from an FBI unit chief
government use of hacking tools, but explaining that most of the relevant
magistrate judge orders are sealed).
118 Poulsen, supra note 21.
119 Id.
120 See In the Matter of the Search of Computers that Access the Website
"Bulletin Board A," No. 8:12MJ3565 (D. Neb. Nov. 16, 2012),
https://www. documentcloud. org/documents/1261620-torpedo-
affidavit.html [https://perma.cc/MJ9E-ARUQ].
121 See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, supra note 77.
122 Joseph Cox, Judge in FBI Hacking Case is Unclear on How FBI Hacking
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released to the public, the government stated that they "try to
make every effort possible to protect the FBI's sensitive tools
and techniques" in order "to ensure that the capabilities of the
CIPAV are minimized [in future media reports], if discussed at
all."124 The email adds, "this and many tools deployed by the
FBI are law enforcement sensitive and, as such, we request
that as little information as possible be provided to as few
individuals as possible."125 Another redacted email instructs
agents to avoid discussing how data collection works in
warrant applications; affidavits; and conversations with case
agents, U.S. Attorneys, squad supervisors, and outside
agencies.126 Although the Supreme Court has stated that the
execution of warrants should generally be left to law
enforcement,127 judges may not be able to properly assess the
invasiveness, effectiveness, and necessity of an electronic
search tool without a sophisticated understanding of how it
functions. As Kevin Poulsen writes, "Depending on the
deployment, an NIT can be a bulky full-featured backdoor
program that gives the government access to your files,
location, web history and webcam for a month at a time, or a
slim, fleeting wisp of code that sends the FBI your computer's
name and address, and then evaporates." 128 The difference
between these two instruments is significant and the limited
information provided to judges leaves the judiciary ill equipped
to distinguish between them.
Furthermore, there is no assurance that, once authorized,
remote access searches will be used exclusively for the
purposes the FBI claims in a given warrant application. In
2011, the largest European hacker club, Chaos Computer Club
(CCC) reverse engineered a "lawful interception" malware
program used by German law enforcement.129 The CCC
determined "that the Trojan's developers never even tried to
put in technical safeguards to make sure the malware can
124 See Email from [redacted], Unit Chief, FBI Cryptologic and Electronic




126 See Email from [redacted] (OTD) to [redacted] (OTD) (CON) et al. 11
(Aug. 15, 2004, 8:31 AM), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode
/cipav/fbi cipav-07.pdf [https://perma.ce/52MF-YF7J].
121 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Judge Denies FBI Request to Hack Computer
in Probe, WALL ST. J. (April 24, 2013), http://onhne.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB 10001424127887324743704578443011661957422
[https://perma.cc/CL46-KA7U].
128 See Poulsen, supra note 21.
129 Chaos Computer Club Analyzes Government Malware, CHAOS COMPUTER
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exclusively be used for wiretapping internet telephony, as set
forth by the constitution court."130 The software included
functionality to surreptitiously insert additional requests for
information from the target's computer beyond the types
approved by the court. 131
The lack of minimization procedures and transparency
raises important concerns regarding the use of remote search
techniques. A formerly classified memo written by the DOJ's
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, exposes a
similar concern: "While the [remote access search] technique is
of indisputable value in certain kinds of cases, we are seeing
indications that it is being used needlessly by some agencies,
unnecessarily raising difficult legal questions (and a risk of
suppression) without any countervailing benefit." 
1 32
B. Increased Frequency of Use
The DOJ does not anticipate that the Rule 41 amendments
will greatly affect the frequency with which agents apply for
remote access search and seizure warrants because out-of-
district warrants are already permitted in certain
circumstances. As the government has emphasized, the
amendments to Rule 41 would not create new search
techniques or weaken the standards for extraterritorial
authorization for that technique. The DOJ states, "if
conducting a remote search of a computer offers the
government practical advantages over conducting a physical
search of the same computer," one would expect to have
already observed an increase in remote searches, which is not
the case.1 33 However, the DOJ does not account for the likely
effect of enacting an explicit mandate for these two
increasingly common circumstances. Currently, the out-of-
district warrant exceptions to Rule 41 are confined to a set of
narrow circumstances that occur with limited frequency.
Conversely, the two circumstances that the amendments
address could apply broadly and impact millions of individuals.
If Rule 41 is amended, the number of extraterritorial
requests for remote access searches will likely grow as the
number of users implementing anonymizing software
increases. Following the summer of 2013, and the revelations
made public by Edward Snowden, the average number of daily
users on Tor more than doubled from 550,000 to over
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Poulsen, supra note 3.
133 Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra, note 31, at 260.
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1,200,000.134 In November 2014, that number was well above
2,000,000.135 As more users turn to Tor or other means of
concealing their identity and location on the Internet, the
government will likely increase its reliance on the exceptions
promulgated in the amendments to Rule 41.
Similarly, the recent growth in botnets presents reason to
believe that, if permitted, multi-district, multi-computer
remote access searches would become commonplace. In 2014,
botnet-operated attacks increased by 240%.136 In fact, it is
estimated that "as many as one quarter of all personal
computers may now be participating in a botnet, unknown to
their owners."137 The number of attacks is expected to grow
immensely as the marketplace for botnets continues to
flourish.138 As proposed, Rule 41 would become one of the FBI's
primary weapons in the fight against botnets, and the
frequency of out-of-district remote access searches would
increase concurrently with the upsurge in botnet related crime.
Additionally, the invasive nature of these searches would
necessarily deepen as individual botnets become more
sophisticated and infect unprecedented numbers of devices.
The amendments, for better or for worse, would give the
government the ability to seek, through a single ex parte
hearing, authorization to remotely search and manipulate the
millions of zombie computers in a given botnet network.
C. Fourth Amendment Concerns
The Advisory Committee suggested "the use of anonymizing
software to mask the location of a computer should not prevent
the issuance of a warrant if the investigators can satisfy the
Fourth Amendment's threshold requirements for obtaining a
warrant."139 The Fourth Amendment requires that the
134 Lee Munson, Tor Usage Doubles in August. New privacy-seeking users or
botnet?, NAKED SECURITY (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://nakedsecurity. sophos .com/2013/08/29/tor-usage-doubles-in-
august-new-privacy-seeking-users -or-botnet [https://perma. cc/L9HK-
22XR].
135 See Direct Users by Country, TOR METRICS,
https://metrics.torproj ect.org/userstats-relay-country.html
[https://perma.cc/D7R5-A52S].
136 Lerner, supra note 25, at 239-240.
137 Discover the Anatomy of a Botnet, IT SECURITY WATCH,
http://www.itsecuritywatch.com/internet-security/discover-the-anatomy-
of-a-botnet [https://perma.cc/2BWT-7SRN].
138 See Lerner, supra note 25, at 3-7. HP Enterprise Services predicts that
by the year 2020, "there will be another million people working in
cybercrime globally." Stilgherrian, Cyber Criminals Are Out-Spending
the Defenders Two to One: HP, ZDNET (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www. zdnet.com/cyber-criminals-are-out-spending-the-defenders-
two-to-one-hp-7000028056 [https://perma.cc/HHH9-HLJG].
139 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 326.
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government describe the target computer with particularity
and demonstrate probable cause that the evidence sought will
"aid in apprehension or conviction of a criminal."140 However,
the Advisory Committee made clear "the amendment[s] do[ ]
not address [these] constitutional questions or attempt to
influence their resolution." 141 Instead, the amendments leave
the constitutional analysis to the courts.1 42 This leaves the Rule
41 amendments vulnerable to attack under Fourth Amendment
standards.
1. Lack of Probable Cause
For one, the government may have difficulty establishing
that the information sought is necessarily related to criminal
activity. In order to obtain a search warrant, the government's
affidavit must establish probable cause, which requires
"enough information for the issuing magistrate to determine
that the items sought are related to the criminal activity under
investigation, and that they may reasonably be expected to be
located in the place to be searched."14 3 In a watering-hole
attack, it is unlikely that the government can demonstrate that
the information seized from each person that visits a website
over the course of the surveillance period will be related to the
investigation. While there may be some websites for which
access alone may violate the law - such as a website that upon
visitation disseminates child pornography to the user - the
vast majority of websites will be frequented by legitimate users
for whom probable cause does not exist. "For example,
members of the press, researchers, policymakers, and attorneys
regularly visit websites associated with terrorist groups, cyber-
criminals, and drug dealers."14 4 In social engineering attacks -
such as the FBI email to the MySpace bomber with a link to a
fake AP story that actually delivered a CIPAV- it may seem
unlikely that the FBI will collect information unrelated to the
criminal activity under investigation. However, the target
could forward the email to others or post the link to social
media. Any innocent person that visited the website containing
the fake news story would become subject to the search despite
a lack of probable cause.
140 Id.
141 Memorandum from Sara Beale & Nancy King, supra note 54, at 158.
142 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8, at 326.
143 Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Mass. 1980).
144 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 22.
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2. The Particularity Requirement: Concerns and
Counterarguments
Similarly, remote access search warrants may not satisfy
the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. Warrants
"must particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as
the place to be searched."145 The particularity requirement
prevents the issuance of general warrants and warrants based
on vague information.146 The Supreme Court has stated that
the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement is
especially important in the eavesdropping context.14 7 Given
that the government is unable to articulate either the location
of the device to be searched or its IP address, there is reason to
doubt the government's ability to meet the particularity
requirement. In fact, in rejecting the FBI's warrant application,
Judge Smith raised a number of questions regarding the
affidavit's satisfaction of the particularity requirement and
expressed concern that "[t]he Government's application
contains little or no explanation of how the Target Computer
will be found."
148
Additional concerns with the particularity requirement
arise in the government's investigations of botnets and
attempts to simultaneously search multiple computers. The
devices in these searches, all targeted by the same warrant, do
not share one owner.1 49 In the physical search context, the
particularity requirement demands that a warrant specify each
individual unit subject to search. When searching a building
with multiple apartments, for example, the warrant must
identify every apartment of interest to investigators.
"Particularity concerns frequently arise in circumstances
where the description in the warrant of the place to be
searched is so vague that it fails reasonably to alert executing
officers to the limits of their search authority."1 50 It follows that
"the same concerns and rules should apply when police search
digital 'occupancies."' 151 In granting a remote-access search
warrant for multiple computers infected by the same botnet,
courts are unable to properly limit the breadth of the applying
agency's search authority.
145 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 239 (1979).
146 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
14. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
148 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
149 See Greenstreet v. County San Bernardino, 41 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.
1994).
150 U.S. v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011).
151 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 21.
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There are, however, numerous counterarguments
indicating that the government's remote access search
techniques fit squarely within the parameters of the
particularity requirement. A single warrant can be used to
search more than one physical location or piece of property only
if there is probable cause to search each location.152 "A separate
warrant for each suspected place to be searched is not called for
either by the letter or the spirit of the constitution . . . To
require it would occasion useless delay and expense, and tend
to defeat the salutary objects of the law."153 Additionally, in the
context of tracking warrants - promulgated in Rule 41(b)(4) -
the government seeks information from locations unknown at
the time of the application. In United States v. Karo, the
Supreme Court ruled that the particularity requirement is
excused if the purpose of the search is, in fact, to determine the
search area.1 54 Furthermore, when collecting evidence from the
Internet, the particularity requirement permits warrants "for
individual suspects rather than individual Internet
accounts."1 55 That is, the government does not need to identify
a specific account that is plausibly connected to the desired
evidence. Rather, it need only specify that a given suspect has
or will use the Internet to receive, store, or transmit evidence
relevant to criminal activity.
3. Additional Fourth Amendment Concerns
However, even if remote access searches generally comport
with particularity requirements, the warrants may authorize
the seizure of broad swaths of information in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The capabilities of remote access search
techniques - as identified above1 56 - are vast, and their use
would likely lead to the collection of information beyond just
the user's location. Judge Smith determined that the sheer
"volume of information" sought by the government did not
amount to "only limited amounts of data" as the affidavit
152 Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 43 at 263.
153 Gray v. Davis, 27 Conn. 447, 455 (1858).
154 Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 43, at 260; see also
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) ("It will still be possible
to describe the object into which the beeper is to be placed, the
circumstances that led agents to wish to install the beeper, and the
length of time for which beeper surveillance is requested. In our view,
this information will suffice to permit issuance of a warrant authorizing
beeper installation and surveillance.").
155 Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi, supra note 43, at 262 (citing
Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1045-46 (2010)).
156 See infra Part II. C.
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claimed.157 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that when
the information sought "is identical in its indiscriminate
character to wiretapping and bugging" it cannot be authorized
solely by a remote access warrant pursuant to Rule 41.158 In
the physical context, investigators cannot simply seize
everything in a house if it poses no rational connection to the
crime. As Laura Donohue stated, "you can't just go on a fishing
expedition. There needs to be a nexus between the crime being
alleged and the material to be seized. What they are doing
here, though, is collecting everything." 1 59 This criticism is
particularly applicable to searches of electronic devices. In its
Riley v. California opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized
that electronic devices, "as a category, implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse." 1 60
But according to one member of the Advisory Committee,
the government may not even need a warrant to acquire
location information from botnet-infected devices.1 61 Similarly,
if the remote searches are solely sought for remediation
purposes such as removing the botnet from the zombie's
computer not the prosecution of the master, the Fourth
Amendment concerns are less relevant. In these instances, the
information collected would not be used at trial and thus the
user would have no standing to exclude the fruits of the
search.162 However, these Fourth Amendment interests would
remain relevant in a civil suit against the offending law
enforcement agents.1
63
The Fourth Amendment requires extra scrutiny for certain
capabilities of remote access search tools, principally
contemporaneous and video surveillance. Although the FBI
labels the real-time surveillance capabilities of remote access
157 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
158 United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984).
159 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 83.
160 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). The opinion goes on to
explain that electronic devices hold a "cache of sensitive personal
information," which expose "far more than the most exhaustive search of
a house." Id. at 290-91.
161 Minutes of Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, supra note 64, at 520.
162 Id. at 525; see also United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989)
(concluding "[tlhe only remedy available within the context of the
criminal trial for fourth amendment violations is the exclusion of any
evidence illegally obtained. In this case, the prosecutor did not attempt to
admit any evidence concerning the examination. Thus, whether or not a
violation has occurred, no remedy is available to Maceo during this
criminal phase of his trial. [This holding does not foreclose other possible
remedies (such as a civil suit against the offending Marshal) outside of
this context if indeed there has been a violation.]").
163 See United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
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search tools - like the prospective collection of routing and
destination information in the investigation of the MySpace
bomb threats - as pen registers, they may, more accurately, be
called trespassory searches. A pen register order is intended to
compel "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information
transmitted by" a device.164 In contrast, the contemporaneous
surveillance authorized pursuant to Rule 41 may be installed
on a target device to monitor and collect information pertaining
to all electronic communications originating from a device. This
may fall within the definition of a Fourth Amendment search
provided in United States v. Jones, which includes occasions
when "the Government physically occupie[s] private property
for the purpose of obtaining information." 165 Relatedly, in his
denial of a remote access warrant, Judge Smith determined
that the remote access search tool's ability to take photos with
the device's camera amounted to a live video feed.166
Accordingly, he ruled that the government did not satisfy the
heightened Fourth Amendment warrant standards for video
surveillance. 
167
Additionally, the amendments to Rule 41 will authorize
remote access searches of all persons regardless of whether
they are inside or outside of the United States. The government
readily admits that it does not know where suspects using
anonymizing technology are located. Before a warrant is
executed, then, the FBI cannot know whether such suspects
are located within or outside of the United States. Although the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply to
searches of non-U.S. persons outside of the country, these
extraterritorial searches are subject to a "requirement of
reasonableness." 168 Citing the presumption against
international extraterritorial application, the DOJ insists that
the amendments do not create authority for searches of
electronic storage media located in foreign countries.169 Yet the
government also asserts, "should the media searched [pursuant
to Rule 41] prove to be outside the United States . . . the
existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of
164 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012).
165 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
166 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2013). The opinion sets out the four
requirements of a warrant authorizing video surveillance in addition to
probable cause - (1) use and failure of alternative investigative methods,
(2) description of the particular communication sought, (3) statement of
the duration of the order, (4) steps to assure minimization - ruling that
the application failed to meet the first and fourth criteria. Id. at 760.
167 Id.
168 In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157,
171 (2d Cir. 2008).
169 Letter from Mythii Raman, supra note 28, at 174-75.
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the search."170 Thus, according to this circular argument,
approval of a remote access search pursuant to Rule 41 would,
by default, authorize a search anywhere in the world. This
interpretation has been the focus of significant media and
public scrutiny. 171
The significance of each Fourth Amendment concern is
magnified by the fact that warrant applications are currently
reviewed ex parte, without adversarial representation. While
the judiciary is well suited to tackle complex questions of
particularity, reasonableness, and probable cause, the
cybercrime context introduces new gray areas that may merit
adversarial briefing.172 Without a technical understanding of
Internet architecture - and no opportunity for oppositional
consultation - a judge may be deprived of the tools needed to
comprehensively evaluate the Fourth Amendment's reach in
this context.173 While wiretap orders are also granted ex
parte,174 a service provider must confirm the order's sufficiency.
Conversely, once approved by a judge, remote access search
warrants are implemented directly by the law enforcement
agency with no third party check. Additionally, because judicial
opinions related to warrants often go unpublished and are
commonly sealed, the capacity for case law development to
tackle these questions, as the Advisory Committee
recommends, may be unrealistic.
D. Circumvention of Existing Legal Oversight
Regimes
The searches authorized under the amendments to Rule 41
may circumvent existing legal regimes. Certain uses of remote
access search techniques would ordinarily require additional
showings and increased burdens under the Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. §2518 ("Title III").175 These same criteria may not apply
to the analysis of applications under the amended Rule 41
framework. When applying for a Title III warrant, the
government must: describe, with particularity, the place and
person to be surveilled; demonstrate that it has exhausted all
other investigative alternatives; and ensure proper constraint
on the duration of the surveillance and minimization of the
collection of communications outside the scope of the
warrant.176 Additionally, the DOJ's Office of Enforcement
170 Id. at 174-75.
"I See Wilkins, supra note 113.
172 See supra note 2, at 18.
173 Id.
174 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3) (2012).
175 The government must obtain a Title III warrant if it seeks to intercept
wire, oral, or electronic communications in real time.
176 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518 (1), (4), (5) (2012).
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Operations must review each wiretap application before it can
be submitted to the court.177 Warrants targeting a device's
camera activate the heightened requirements for video
surveillance imposed by Title 111.178 The same is true for
mechanisms used to activate a device's microphone or to record
contents of incoming or outgoing communications. Any attempt
to conduct real-time surveillance necessarily requires
compliance with the amplified strictures of 18 U.S.C. § 3123.179
Yet warrant applications for these same search methods
pursuant to Rule 41 may be authorized without being subjected
to the rigorous Title III requirements. Creating new exceptions
to Rule 41's venue requirements may enable the FBI to avoid
the heightened Title III burdens by applying for Rule 41
warrants instead. As such, a "warrant application submitted
under Rule 41 may be constitutionally insufficient and
infirm." 180
Additionally, the altered Rule 41 notice requirements do not
guarantee that all relevant parties will be notified of a remote
access search. As drafted, the amendments would permit the
government to provide notice to either "the person whose
property was searched or whose information was seized or
copied."181 This means the individual who owns the remotely
accessed device may never receive notification that his or her
property was searched. Similarly, the actual owner of the
seized information might not be provided notice of the search
and thus would remain ignorant of his or her ability to
challenge its constitutionality. 182 This is especially troubling for
locations with publicly shared computers such as libraries and
schools.
177 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 18.
178 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Even though Title III does not
technically cover authorization of surreptitious video, courts have
consistently imposed its requirements. See also United States v. Cuevas-
Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci,
786 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d
875, 884 (7th Cir. 1984).
179 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012).
180 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 18.
181 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
supra note 24, at 338 (emphasis added).
182 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 24.
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The amendment to Rule 41 could also have a significant
impact on law enforcement and judicial practices, eventually
leading the government to forum shop. The ACLU argues that
the amendments would expand the judiciary's power to grant
search warrants in two ways.18 3 First, the amendments would
broaden magistrate judges' jurisdictional authority, permitting
a magistrate judge "in any district where activities related to a
crime may have occurred" to issue the remote access search
warrant.18 4 In the cybercrime context, activities related to a
crime often implicate conduct in multiple areas of the country,
leaving the government with a plethora of districts to choose
from when shopping a warrant. Second, the amendments
would enable warrants that authorize searches both within and
outside of a district. In the botnet context, for example, judges
would be empowered to authorize multi-district, multi-
computer search warrants with repercussions across many
jurisdictions, despite differing circuit law and precedent.
Combined, these two enlargements of authority could generate
powerful forum shopping effects, allowing the FBI to
systematically select the district considering its applications
and potentially circumvent the legal protections put into place
by the district where the warrant should actually have been
evaluated.
E. Unintended Consequences
The amendments' enactment may bring about
unanticipated consequences for the public and for law
enforcement. First, the amendments may adversely affect
Internet infrastructure, causing disruption to innocent third
parties, weakening security for both the target of the search
and law enforcement, and exposing the investigation to
tampering. Second, the amendments may incentivize
government stockpiling of zero-day exploits and use of
surreptitious malware. Finally, as described above, the
alterations to Rule 41 could lead to forum shopping by
investigators.
1. Effect on Internet Population and Infrastructure
Remote access search techniques could inadvertently deny
access to a target website or disrupt the functionality of a
target computer. While altering a website's code during a
watering-hole attack, the government may impede
functionality of the website. As part of a 2013 watering hole
183 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning Remote Searches of Electronic
Storage Media, supra note 2.
184 Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, supra note 8.
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attack, the FBI deliberately caused all websites on a given
server to cease transmission of their intended content, and
instead display an error message.18 5 This type of disruption
could have an immense impact on websites and their owners.
An online store taken offline for one day could lose $10,000 in
sales.18 6 Regardless of the site's functionality, the site itself
could end up suffering even greater loss in reputational
damage as a result of the malfunction.18 7 Similarly, the
installation of software on a user's computer could impede the
device's utility. Although the affidavit filed in support of the
Operation Torpedo warrant application makes assurances that
"the NIT will not deny the user of the 'activating' computer
access to any data or functionality of that computer," it does
not provide any explanation or rationale to support its
claims.18
8
The potential to disable a targeted computer becomes
especially troubling in the botnet context. In these
investigations, the targeted devices are owned and operated by
innocent users who are victims of criminal activity. The
Computer & Communications Industry Association notes,
"attempting to hack botnets . . . can damage many of the
computers connected to them."18 9 Recently discovered malware,
believed by some to be used by U.S. authorities in their
surveillance efforts, "clearly impairs the operation of the target
computers in multiple ways, including by draining battery life
and using bandwidth and other computer resources."19 0
Considering that victims of a botnet would neither be required
to consent to the search nor receive notice in most cases, the
harms would be particularly in conflict with their civil liberties.
Known flaws in surveillance software may weaken the
security of both the target's and law enforcement's devices, as
185 See Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass
Malware Attack, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/09
/freedom -hosting-fbi [https://perma.ce/26QJ-XAHW].
186 7he Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage, supra note 29,
at 6.
187 See id.
188 See In the Matter of the Search of Computers that Access the Website
"Bulletin Board A", No. 8:12MJ3565, at 31 (D. Neb. Nov. 16, 2012),
https://www. documenteloud. org/documents/1261620-torpedo-
affidavit.html [https://perma.ce/MJ9E-ARUQ].
189 See supra note 16.
190 Dennis Fisher, Experts Question Legality of Use of Regin Malware by
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well as expose the investigation to tampering.191 When security
researchers examined the surveillance software used by
German law enforcement to remotely monitor targets, they
were "shocked by the lack of even elementary security in the
code."192 Firstly, the targeted user faced potential privacy
breaches because the files transmitted to law enforcement in
the exfiltration stage were poorly encrypted.193 This meant that
individuals other than authorities could potentially view
screenshots and listen to audio being captured.1 94 Similarly,
other surveillance software had backdoors permitting hackers
to "gain access to the system ... and listen to recorded calls
without authentication."19 5 Additionally, due to the poor
craftsmanship of the software, third parties could actually use
the law enforcement tool to penetrate the target's system.196
Second, the software weakened the law enforcement agencies'
own security, making it "conceivable that the law enforcement
agencies' IT infrastructure could be attacked through this
channel."197 Finally, German law enforcement did not verify
that the evidence collected actually originated from the target's
computer.198 Thus, law enforcement may instead have been
analyzing imitated data.
Further, this is especially concerning in light of the well-
documented flaws in the U.S. government's information
technology procurement process.1 99 Federal agencies reported
more than 25,000 security breaches in 2013, which was more
than double the amount reported in 2010.200 This presents
various concerns regarding the security and authenticity of the
information gathered as well as the potential openings
generated for hackers in both the target's and law
enforcement's systems.
191 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 9.







199 See supra note 2 (citing Craig Timberg and Lena H. Sun, Some Say
Health-Care Site's Problems Highlight Flawed Federal IT Policies, WASH.




200 Jeryl Bier, Security Breaches of Personal Information at Federal Agencies
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The FBI cannot predict every harmful consequence of
surreptitiously disseminating code to a device. Expanding the
circumstances under which remote access searches are
permitted only increases the chances that such harms are
realized. The warrant applications available to the public do
little to address these fears of disruption and the amendments
provide no additional safeguards. Judges are given insufficient
information about the methods by which the search will be
implemented and the precautions, if any, that have been taken
to ensure ancillary harms are minimized.
One such harm is the infection of innocent users. In his
rejection of the FBI's warrant application, Judge Smith
acknowledged, "the Government's application offers nothing
but indirect and conclusory assurance that its search technique
will avoid infecting innocent computers or devices."20 1 He
considered the potential injuries generated by an investigation
of a target computer in a public library, public Internet caf6, or
workplace.202 A remote access search could bring about
devastating consequences if targeting a shared computer,
whether used for public means or shared among friends or
family. The government could inadvertently collect personal,
identifying information about individuals unrelated to the
crime, simultaneously violating those individuals' rights and
sidetracking the investigation. When similar mistakes happen
in the physical context, it is easy to recognize the harm. When
the Washington, D.C. police used a battering ram to break into
a home that the suspect had moved out of 18 months before, it
was evident to the injured party that his privacy had been
invaded.203 But in the digital context, the wrongly targeted
individuals may not even know they have been affected.
The potential to entangle innocent users in a remote access
search is even greater in watering hole attacks. In fact, an FBI
surveillance tool implemented in August 2013 evoked this very
concern. The FBI used a watering-hole attack on all websites
hosted by the Freedom Hosting server on the Tor network.204
The mechanism caused altered websites to display an error
message which secretly delivered hidden code to all visiting
users, causing their devices to transmit identifying information
to the FBI.20 5 Although the FBI intended to collect information
201 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
202 Id.
203 See Sommer Mathis, D.C. Police Raided the Wrong House, DCIST (Jan 26,
2010), http://dcist.com/2010/01/de police raided the wrong house.php
[https://perma.ce/VDJG-445Q].
204 See Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass
Malware Attack, supra note 185.
205 See id.
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on Tor users that frequented sites distributing child
pornography, the mechanism inadvertently impacted all sites
hosted by Freedom Hosting, including a number of legitimate
sites that did not host illicit images, such as TorMail, "long
considered the most secure anonymous email operation
online."20 6 The fact that a website is hosted on the same server
as a website suspected of accommodating wrongdoing is not
sufficient justification for sanctioning government-run hacks of
every person that uses that website. "Law-abiding Internet
users have no way of knowing if the sites that they are visiting
are hosted on the same physical server as a site that facilitates
illegal conduct."207 This invasive conduct "weaken[s] the
technology used by human rights workers and activists" and
creates "the potential for innocent parties to wind up infected
with government malware because they visited the wrong
website."208 Beyond the hypothetical harms posed by the search
methods, the public ought to take issue with the government's
lack of transparency and failure to support its assurances that
innocent users will not be impacted.
2. Incentives for Government Stockpiling of Zero-
Day Exploits
Under the proposed amendments, the government would
have greater incentive to invest in exploitations that could be
used to deliver remote access search tools. In order to utilize a
social-engineering or watering-hole attack, law enforcement
must exploit either out-of-date or vulnerable software on the
target's computer. As such, the government can only infiltrate
the suspect's device if two conditions are satisfied: first, the
government must have knowledge of the vulnerability; and
second, the targeted user must not have patched this
206 Darlene Storm, FBI Behind Firefox Zero-Day Compromising Half of All
Tor Sites, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.computerworld
.com/article/2473739/cybercrime-hacking/fbi-behind-firefox-zero-day-
compromising-haf-of-all-tor-sites-.html [https://perma.cc/92N6-54VK].
Although the FBI confirmed its involvement in the attack, neither the
warrant application nor the court order in the case is available to the
public. Thus, two explanations are reasonably possible: the judge
authorized a broad warrant permitting the attack on a wide spectrum of
websites, or the FBI exceeded the scope of the warrant in the course of
the attack. Considering the sparse descriptions that these warrants
usually include, it is also possible that the application was worded so
broadly that the judge did not fully understand what he or she was
sanctioning.
207 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104, at 15.
208 See Poulsen, supra note 21.
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vulnerability.209 The first condition is accomplishable by
dedicating resources to purchase or discover these exploits. In
fact, a growing industry specializes in identifying security
vulnerabilities to sell to governments as well as hackers.210 To
satisfy the second condition, the government can rely on the
failure of users to update their software or its ability to
convince manufacturers to delay patching vulnerabilities.
Alternatively, the government can accomplish both conditions
by investing resources into procuring zero-day exploits.
Zero-day exploits are those that even the manufacturer of
the software does not know about and thus has not patched.
211
A recent leak of data from spyware developer Hacking Team
shows that the company offered multiple zero-day exploits to
its customers and provided services for a number of law
enforcement agencies.21 2 The FBI spent nearly $775,000 on the
company's tools.213 One leaked email makes clear that the FBI
retained the Hacking Team's services for its Remote Control
System tools, which came loaded with zero-day exploits.
214
As software manufacturers and users update their software
more regularly, zero-day exploits become the only feasible
option to deliver remote access search tools. Due to recent
modifications, Tor users are now more likely to patch
vulnerabilities. "Until September of 2014, the Tor Browser
Bundle did not include a built-in security update
mechanism."215 This left Tor users open to vulnerabilities that
209 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of
Electronic Storage Media, supra note 104.
210 Andy Greenberg, Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers' Secret




211 See What is a Zero-Day Vulnerability?, PC TOOLS,
http://www.pctools.com/security-news/zero-day-vulnerability.
212 See Kim Zetter, Hacking Team Leak Shows How Secretive Zero-Day
Exploit Sales Work, WIRED (Jul. 24, 2015),
http://www.wired. com/2015/07/hacking-team-leak-shows -secretive-zero-
day-exploit-sales-work [https://perma.cc/3HH4-73PF]; see also Swati
Khandelwal, How Hacking Team and FBI Planned to Unmask a Tor
User, THE HACKER NEWS (July 15, 2015),
http://thehackernews.com/2015/07/fbi-hacking-team-tor-network.html
[https://perma.cc/DQT9-7YKK]; Sara Peters, 4 Lasting Impacts of the
Hacking Team Leaks, DARKREADING (July 15, 2015),
http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/4-lasting-impacts-of-the-
hacking-team-leaks/d/d-id/1321317 [https://perma.cc/9DN7-W2HW].
213 See Zetter, supra note 212; see also Khandelwal, supra note 212; Peters,
supra note 212.
214 See Khandelwal, supra note 212.
215 See supra note 104 (citing mikeperry, Tor Browser 3. 6.5 and 4.0-alpha-2
Are Released, TOR BLOG (Oct. 30, 2014),
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had been discovered and patched by the developer but
remained unpatched until the user manually downloaded the
updates on his or her own. However, recent alterations to the
Tor software introduced a mechanism that makes it more
convenient and simple for Tor users to update the bundle.
216
Furthermore, efforts by independent users are making it more
likely that the Tor software will soon update automatically,217
which would greatly reduce the number of Tor users falling
prey to known but unpatched vulnerabilities. This would, in
turn, increase the government's reliance on zero-day exploits.
Ultimately, expanding the FBI's license to use remote access
searches would correspondingly increase government demand
for zero-day exploits.
Dependence on zero-day exploits incentivizes the
exploitation of vulnerabilities rather than the notification of
manufacturers. The government's decision to prioritize offense
over defense puts its own citizens at risk and is explicitly
criticized by many both within and outside of the government.
Former White House cybersecurity advisor Richard Clarke said
in an interview, "if the U.S. government knows of a
vulnerability that can be exploited, under normal
circumstances, its first obligation is to tell U.S. users.218
Similarly, the Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies recently stated, "it is in the
national interest to eliminate software vulnerabilities rather
than to use them for US intelligence collection." 21 9 However,
the value in a zero-day exploit is only maintained if the
government does the exact opposite and keeps the information
secret until it can be used.
https://blog. torproj ect. org/blog/tor-browser- 365-and-40-alpha-2-are-
released [https://perma.ce/ZL58-TWRK]).
216 Id.
217 See phobos, Google Funds an Auto-Update for Vidalia, TOR BLOG (June 6,
2008), https://blog.torproj ect.org/blog/google-funds-auto-update-vidalia
[https://perma.ce/5MAQ-TFGF]; see also Micah Lee, Tor Browser
Launcher, MICAH LEE'S BLOG, https://micahflee.com/torbrowser-launcher
[https://perma.ce/3R6F-ARGG] (describing an independent effort to create
an automatic Tor security update delivery mechanism).
218 Joseph Menn, Special Report: U.S. Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of
Blowback, REUTERS (May 10, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-usa-cyberweapons-
specialreport-idUSBRE9490EL20130510 [https://perma.cc/GT5Z-K3XD].
219 PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMM'NS TECHS., LIBERTY
AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 37, 220 (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
12 rg final report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MNY-JGYY].
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3. The Effects of Forum Shopping
The potential for forum shopping created by the
amendments could propagate a system of "extraterritorial
hacking," under which investigators could rely on magistrates
in their local district or judges they know to be sympathetic to
the law enforcement perspective.220 While more convenient for
the government, this practice implicates concerns regarding
the proper forum in which suspects should file motions.221 A
suspect should not be forced to travel great distances in order
to defend him or herself in a court of law and "courts should
uniformly discourage forum shopping or judge selection."
222
Although out-of-district warrants are permitted in the ECPA
context, Professor Orin Kerr argues that ECPA's multi-district
warrant authority is justified by the deregulation of the
telecommunications industry, which is not applicable to Rule
41.223 Similarly, "if the arguments in favor of nationwide
remote searches are persuasive, why are they not also
persuasive for physical searches?"
224
III. Suggested Alterations to Rule 41
In light of the concerns detailed above, the Rule 41
amendments currently under review by the Supreme Court
must be modified. This section will outline these suggestions in
three categories. First, this section will detail two major
alterations to the Rule 41 amendments intended to limit the
collection capabilities of remote access searches: (1) the
exception for criminals using anonymizing software should only
permit the collection of a user's IP address or MAC Address
and (2) Rule 41 should not have an exception for violations of
the CFAA. Second, Rule 41 should require the government to
supply additional details and meet more rigorous standards in
its warrant applications. This includes: satisfying a
preliminary showing that the location of the concealed device
cannot reasonably be ascertained without an extraterritorial
remote access search; requiring a thorough and technical
description of both the search tool's installation process and
location collection method; and mandating the implementation
220 Memorandum from Orin Kerr to Members of the Rule 41 Subcomm. at 1-
2 (Feb. 3, 2014), in Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, supra note 18, at
239-40.
221 See id.
222 United States v. Bailey, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1051 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
223 Memorandum from Orin Kerr to the Members of the Rule 41 Subcomm.
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and description of minimization and accountability measures to
limit harm. Finally, this section will recommend that Rule 41
require the government to provide notice to both the owner of
the property searched as well as the owner of the information
seized.
A. Limitations on Remote Access Searches
1. Minimizing the Information Collected from
Anonymous Users
Extraterritorial warrants targeting anonymous users
should only authorize the collection of IP and MAC addresses.
The government presents a compelling argument for carving
out suspects who conceal their location from Rule 41's in-
district venue requirement. However, the government has not
presented an adequate justification for collecting more than
basic identifying information. Limiting the scope of remote
access search warrants would dispel many of the concerns
detailed above while appropriately accounting for the hurdles
impeding effective investigation and prosecution. After
collecting a target's IP and MAC addresses, the FBI can then
initiate further investigation procedures - whether through
additional Rule 41 warrant applications, ECPA, Title III, or
other avenues - if investigators think a greater amount of
information is necessary.
An individual who employs an anonymizing service or
frequents a hidden server on the Tor network ("User A") should
not be subject to greater scrutiny than an individual who does
not conceal his or her location ("User B"). To investigate User
B, law enforcement agents would use his or her already
available IP or MAC address to engage in a "first step" of
surveillance and collection. This would include subpoenaing the
user's ISP for information associated with the account and
possibly applying for a search warrant, wiretap, or pen register
trap and trace. When applying for a remote access search
warrant, the government would not satisfy an exception to
Rule 41's venue requirements and would have to go to a judge
in the district where the device is located.
Investigating User A should be no different. The
capabilities authorized pursuant to Rule 41's new exception
should be limited to providing only that information the
government would have had access to if User A had not utilized
anonymizing technology. The extraterritorial warrant
authorized in the investigation of User A should be viewed as a
"step zero," necessary to permit the government to get to the
first step of surveillance. While obtaining a list of programs
running on User A's computer, installing a pen register to
record the user's Internet activity, and enabling the user's
2016
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webcam could be useful in the investigation, none of these
capabilities would have been available to law enforcement in
its investigation of User B without consulting a judge in the
proper district. These tools should not be available for use in
the investigation of User A until step zero is accomplished. At
that point, the government will be aware of the user's location
and should direct any subsequent warrant applications to the
appropriate district.
In Operation Torpedo, the government conducted an
effective investigation despite the limited collection capabilities
permitted by its remote access search warrant. The authorized
watering-hole attack collected nothing more than the visitors'
IP addresses, MAC addresses, and types of operating systems.
The operation returned identifying information for over 25 site
visitors, allowing the FBI to organize coordinated raids across
the country and bring 14 suspects to trial.225 This exemplary
use of a watering-hole attack indicates that restricting the
capabilities of remote searches to the simplest identifying
information is practical and can achieve the results desired.
This limitation would lessen the harms generated through
extraterritorial remote access searches. The collection of a
user's IP address is less harmful to that user than the
collection of his or her browsing history, email content, or
other, more personal information. This applies to both
legitimate criminal suspects and innocent users affected by an
overly broad collection effort. Users of TorMail, whose data was
inadvertently collected in the FBI's investigation of the
Freedom Hosting server, fall into the latter category. These
individuals would have faced far less harm if the government
simply collected their IP addresses rather than their email
communications and photographs.
Altering the amendment in this fashion would also reduce
the likelihood of forum shopping because the government's
choice of district would only affect the collection of IP and MAC
addresses. If the government pursued a second warrant with
more invasive capabilities, it would have to be in the district
where the device is located. This would be more convenient for
users who may challenge the collection of information and
potentially make notification more feasible. Additionally,
limiting the amendment would prevent the circumvention of
existing legal oversight regimes. After collecting a target's IP
address, law enforcement agents would be required to follow
standard procedure to engage in more invasive surveillance
tactics. Limiting the capabilities of the search such that law
enforcement can only collect preliminary identifying
225 See Poulsen, supra note 21.
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information would ensure Fourth Amendment compliance, as
required by United States v. Karo.2 6 It would also prevent the
FBI from obtaining extraterritorial remote access search
warrants for video and photography capabilities that require
greater Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
2. Eliminating the Extraterritorial Exception for
Botnet Investigations
Similarly, Rule 41 should not include an extraterritorial
carve-out for botnets because the government's justification for
such a need, rooted in efficiency, is not compelling. Either the
Supreme Court or Congress should modify the amendments by
removing the language permitting out-of-district authorization
of simultaneous multi-district, multi-computer searches.
Removing this exception would not affect the government's
ability to collect information from and disseminate commands
to zombies in a botnet network. It would merely require that
the government apply for separate warrants in the
corresponding district of each infected user. This change would
eliminate Fourth Amendment concerns about whether multi-
district, multi-computer search warrants satisfy the
particularity requirement.
The long-term consequences of authorizing a government
search of millions of innocent users are unknown. Those
infected with a botnet are innocent strangers. The government
should not be allowed to manipulate these users' computers
based upon the power of a single warrant, especially given that
these users are likely dispersed throughout the world. These
concerns outweigh the government's desire to save
investigatory and judicial time and energy. In fact, the
"inefficiencies" worrying the government could serve as proper
and necessary checks on authority.
The government can adequately eradicate botnets through
more modest means. In recent years, the FBI has successfully
hijacked and eliminated a number of botnets without being
exempted from Rule 41's venue requirements. In 2011, the
government initiated and won a civil suit in federal court to
obtain a temporary restraining order. The order allowed the
government to replace servers, collect IP addresses, and deliver
a disabling command.227 Also, DOJ and Microsoft formed a
226 See Memorandum from Jonathan Wroblewsi supra note 31 and supra
notes 144 and accompanying text. United States v. Karo held that the
particularity requirement is excused if the purpose of the search is, in
fact, to determine the search area. If only collecting preliminary
identifying information, a remote access search would be doing just that.
221 See Lerner, supra note 25 (citing Kim Zetter, With Court Order, FBI
Hijacks 'Coreflood'Botnet, Sends Kill Signal, supra note 33).
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public-private partnership, by which Microsoft initiates civil
suits based on trademark claims in order to mitigate and
disable botnets around the world.228 The government has
multiple tools at its disposal to effectively immobilize botnet
networks and alert innocent users of infections. Overhauling
Rule 41's venue requirements for CFAA violations, and as a
result placing innocent users' Fourth Amendment rights in
jeopardy, is an unwarranted and egregious step under these
circumstances.
B. Requiring Greater Detail in Warrant
Applications
The amendments should be modified to require a
preliminary showing that the location of the concealed device
cannot reasonably be ascertained absent an extraterritorial
remote access search. This alteration would impose a valuable
check on the government, and even limit the frequency with
which the new Rule 41 exclusions are used. Applying for an
extraterritorial remote access search warrant should not be the
FBI's first investigative undertaking. Instead, the government
should expend reasonable efforts to determine a suspect's
location and, if possible, appear in the appropriate court to
obtain an in-district warrant. A recent study revealed, "81% of
Tor users could be de-anonymized by analyzing router
information." 229 If such a technique is feasible, the FBI can
simultaneously avoid extraterritorial warrants while saving
both investigatory and judicial time and resources.
Judge Smith recognized the need for more details in his
rejection of the government's warrant application. He pointed
to the hypocrisy in the FBI's simultaneous application for a
remote access search warrant and an order under 18 U.S.C. §
2703 compelling an ISP to turn over all records related to the
account. In its application for subscriber records pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703, the government swore that the records would
likely reveal information about the identities and locations of
the users.230 Yet the same agent swore in a separate affidavit to
Judge Smith that no technique, other than a remote access
search, was likely to succeed. Accordingly, Judge Smith ruled,
"the Government cannot have it both ways."
23 1
228 See generally Lerner, supra note 25.
229 Martin Anderson, 81 % of Tor Users Can Be De-Anonymised by Analysing
Router Information, Research Indicates, THE STACK (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://thestack.com/chakravarty-tor-traffic-analysis-141114
[https://perma.ce/M5LG-PXEG].
230 See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
231 Id.
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The Supreme Court or Congress should look to Title III for
language outlining the necessary level of detail for a warrant
application. Title III contains a provision requiring "a full and
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous."232 The DOJ opposes such a requirement because it
could "lead to litigation over how much the government knew
or could learn."233 In the government's opinion, such a
requirement could mandate the involvement of the National
Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency in order to
demonstrate that the location of the targeted computer is
unknown. However, the DOJ made concessions that "it might
be possible to draft language that referred to the type of
technology."234 To accommodate the government's concerns, the
new preliminary showing requirement could focus on the
importance of using the technology requested, rather than the
government's knowledge. As applied, the rule would mandate a
preliminary showing that the government expended all
reasonable resources to determine the suspect's location,
without reference to the government's actual knowledge at the
time of application.
The Supreme Court or Congress should also modify the
amendments to mandate an individualized and detailed
description of the technical process the government will use to
install the remote access search tool and collect location
information. This change would increase oversight of the
technical search techniques authorized by Rule 41.235 It would
also bolster transparency in the Rule 41 extraterritorial
warrant application regime.236 Transparency would mitigate
the collateral harm to targets, innocent third parties, the
government, and Internet infrastructure generally. Currently,
the FBI only discloses that the search tool will alter the
suspect's device and collect information. This is not adequate.
Instead, the warrant should include, in thorough detail, a step-
by-step list of how the remote access search tool will be
installed on the device as well as an explicit and technical
rundown of how the search tool will alter the targeted device.
The government's argument that revealing sensitive and
classified techniques could jeopardize other investigations is
not compelling. Even if transparency did threaten future
investigations, the government could be given the opportunity
232 18U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012).
233 See Minutes of Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, supra note 68, at 15.
234 Id.
235 See id. at 8.
236 See supra Section IV.A.
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to request that the sensitive and classified details be redacted
when the affidavit and opinion are published. This would
enable a judge to rule on a warrant application with sufficient
insight into the process while eschewing government concerns
over investigative effectiveness. Requiring detailed, technical
descriptions is especially important considering the lack of
adversarial representation, and does not necessarily bar the
government from keeping certain information inaccessible to
criminals.
Finally, Rule 41 should mandate that the warrant
application include a section discussing minimization and
accountability measures. In particular, the government should
aim to protect third parties, prevent the malicious code from
disrupting the user's device, and defend both the target and
government's systems from security breaches. Mandating a
discussion of minimization and accountability would be a major
improvement on the current warrant-application requirements.
As Judge Smith suggested, "the Government has offered little
more than vague assurances." 237
While the transparency argued for above would be most
effective in ensuring that the government avoids inflicting
external harm, two additional stipulations would help. First,
when implementing watering-hole attacks, the government
should be required to list each site it intends to alter. This
would prevent the type of mistake that occurred during the
Freedom Hosting investigation, when a remote access search
was conducted on thousands of innocent users. Second, Rule 41
should require that the government post a bond commensurate
to the risk posed to individuals and businesses that could
potentially face disruption through the search process. This
would hold the government accountable in the case of a failed
piece of surreptitious code that accidently crashes a website or
disrupts a device.
C. Notice to All Relevant Parties
The Supreme Court or Congress should revise Rule 41's
notice requirements for remote access searches. Rule 41 should
compel the government to make reasonable efforts to serve a
copy of the warrant on both the person whose property was
searched and the person whose information was seized or
copied. The additional requirement does not burden law
enforcement agents significantly but provides the necessary
assurance that all relevant parties will be made aware of the
search. It is important to note that, if either the Supreme Court
231 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
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or Congress limits extraterritorial remote access searches to
the collection of IP and MAC addresses as suggested above,
this expanded notice requirement would no longer apply to
extraterritorial searches. Because IP and MAC addresses
provide information about the owner of the computer, the
person whose property was searched would be the same person
whose information was seized. However, the alteration to the
notice requirement would remain important outside of the
extraterritorial warrant context, for which the full gamut of
remote access search capabilities would remain available. As
such, the notice requirement should be altered to protect users
whenever the owner of property searched is different from the
owner of the information seized.
CONCLUSION
Although the amendments to Rule 41 merely seek to extend
extraterritorial warrant authority to two emerging
cybercrimes, these changes, if unchecked, could effectively
transform remote access search warrants into ubiquitous
surveillance tools. The government's desire to create an
exception for violations of the CFAA in multiple districts -
including botnet attacks - is based in practicality and
efficiency. While this element of the Rule 41 amendments could
promote frugality in the criminal justice system, the
preservation of government resources does not justify the
authorization of multi-district, multi-computer searches of
millions of individuals by a single court order.
However, the necessity for extraterritorial remote access
search warrants to determine the location of users concealing
their online identities is compelling. Creating an explicit
exception for users implementing anonymizing techniques is
critical to ensuring that the FBI can prevent grave, Internet-
based crimes. But the need for extraterritorial authority only
extends to the acquisition of a user's most basic identifying
information. After collecting the user's IP or MAC address, the
FBI can, and should, continue its investigation as if the suspect
had never concealed his or her identity in the first place.
Furthermore, the amendments, as currently drafted, do not
provide the judiciary with sufficient resources or information to
competently assess the l gality and consequences of remote
access searches. Supplementing Rule 41 with the necessary
oversight and transparency regimes, as well as requiring more
detailed information from law enforcement, will alleviate this
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